Dekker, S. W. A. (2002). Reconstructing the human contribution to accidents: The new view of human error and performance. Journal of Safety Research, 33(3), 371-385.
Dekker, S. W. A. (2004). The hindsight bias is not a bias and not about history. Human Factors and Aerospace Safety, 4(2), 87-99.
Dekker, S. W. A. (2007). Eve and the Serpent: A rational choice to err. Journal of religion and health, 46(1), 571-579.
Dekker, S. W. A. (2007). Why doctors are more dangerous than gun-owners: A rejoinder to error counting. Human Factors, 49(2), 177-184.
Mikkers, M., Henriqson, E., & Dekker, S. W. A. (2012). Managing multiple and conflicting goals in dynamic and complex situations: Exploring the practical field of maritime pilots. Journal of Maritime Research, 9(2), 13-18.
Dekker, S. W. A. (2013). What is rational about killing a patient with an overdose? Enlightenment, continental philosophy and the role of the human subject in system failure. Ergonomics, 54(8), 679-683.
Dekker, S. W. A., Nyce, J. M., & Myers, D. J. (2013). The little engine who could not: Rehabilitating the individual in safety research. Cognition, Technology & Work, 15, 277-282.
Dekker, S. W. A. (2014). Deferring to expertise versus the prima donna syndrome: A manager’s dilemma. Cognition, Technology and Work, 16, 541-548.
Dekker, S. W. A. (2015). The danger of losing situation awarenss. Cognition, Technology & Work, 17(2), 159-161.
