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Dekker, S. W. A. & Hugh, T. B. (2010). Balancing “No Blame” with accountability in patient safety. New England Journal of Medicine, 362(3), 275.
Dekker, S. W. A. (2011). The criminalization of human error in aviation and healthcare: A review. Safety Science, 49(2), 121-127.
Asberg, R., Hummerdal, D., & Dekker, S. W. A. (2011). There are no qualitative methods, nor quantitative for that matter: The misleading rhetoric of the qualitative-quantitative argument. Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, 12(5), 408-415.
Dekker, S. W. A., Cilliers, P., Hofmeyr, J. H. (2011). The complexity of failure: Implications of complexity theory for safety investigations. Safety Science, 49(6), 939-945.
Dekker, S. W. A. (2011). What is rational about killing a patient with an overdose? Enlightenment, continental philosophy and the role of the human subject in system failure. Ergonomics, 54(8), 679-683.
Dekker, S. W. A. (2011). Systems thinking 1.0 and systems thinking 2.0: Complexity science and a new conception of “cause.” Aviation in focus: An international aeronautical journal, 2(2), 21-39.
Henriqson, E., van Winsen, R., Saurin, T. A., & Dekker, S. W. A. (2011). How a cockpit calculates its speed and why errors while doing this are so hard to detect. Cognition, Technology and Work, 13(4), 217-231.
Stoop, J. & Dekker, S. W. A. (2012). Are safety investigations proactive? Safety Science, 50(6), 1422-1430.
Dekker, S. W. A. (2012). Complexity, signal detection, and the application of ergonomics: Reflections on a healthcare case study. Applied Ergonomics, 43, 468-472.
